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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that your company specializes in the maintenance and repair
of private aircraft. One of your customers, Paul Pilot, and his friend, Rick
Ride-a-Long, die when Paul crashes his aircraft. The estate of Rick Ride-aLong brings suit against your company, the estate of Paul Pilot, and the
manufacturer of the aircraft, Broken Wings. While there is some evidence
that, on two occasions, your company's maintenance work on the aircraft
was subpar, it is more than likely that the crash was either caused by pilot
error or a design defect in the aircraft. Both Broken Wings and Pilot's estate
decide not to risk trial and settle with Ride-a-Long's estate. Due to your
shallow pockets and relatively low liability, however, you decided to take
your chances at trial.
The jury finds for Ride-a-Long's estate. If the liability of all the parties
were weighed against one another, the jury would have found Pilot 40%
liable, Broken Wings 36% liable, and your company 24% liable. Under
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Illinois law, you would only be severally liable for your portion of Ride-aLong's damages, because your liability is under 25%. 1 According to the
recent Illinois Supreme Court ruling in Ready v. United/Goedecke Services,
Inc., settled defendants are not to be considered when apportioning liability
between parties.2 Under this interpretation of the statute, you would be
found3 to be 100% liable, and thus responsible for all of the plaintiff's damages.
This Note addresses four main issues arising out of the Ready decision. First, it considers whether or not the Ready court correctly interpreted
the language of the statute and the intent of the legislature. Second, it contemplates if Ready marks a divergence from precedent as to the use of
grammar in interpreting statutory language. Third, this Note considers if
Ready marks a divergence from precedent as to the use of amended language in interpreting statutory language. Finally, it addresses important
considerations defendants must now consider before deciding to settle a
case.
In part II, this Note first looks at the history of 735 ILCS 5/2-1117 and
the two divergent ways Illinois courts have interpreted its language.4 Next,
Part III looks at the facts of Ready ' and how it came to be heard before the
Illinois Supreme Court. Next, part IV considers the arguments contemplated by both the plurality and the dissent, and then analyzes the merits of
the court's holding. Finally, part V addresses the practical impacts of the
Ready ruling as well as any policy problems the decision has created.
This Note argues that the plurality opinion in Ready came to the wrong
conclusion. For reasons of legislative intent, statutory interpretation, fairness, and judicial economy, settled defendants should be considered when
apportioning liability between parties to a suit. In order to rectify the mistake, the Illinois Legislature should once again amend the statute to specifi1. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (2008). It should also be noted that the damages
discussed in this Note refer to damages based "in actions on account of bodily injury or
death or physical damage to property, based on negligence, or product liability based on
strict tort liability." Id.
2.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Servs., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 734 (I11.2008).
3. Of course, damages to be paid will be offset by the amount of plaintiff's settlement with the other parties as long as they arise from the same injury. See Henry by Henry v.
St. John's Hosp., 563 N.E.2d 410, 416 (ill. 1990). Defendants may also seek payment from
other tortfeasors under a theory of contribution if the defendant has paid more than its pro
rata share as long as those other defendants have not settled in good faith. See 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 100/2 (2002).

4.
Compare Skaggs v. Senior Servs. of Cent. Ill., Inc., 823 N.E.2d 1021, 1028-29
(Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding that settled defendant's liability should be considered), with
Lombardo v. Reliance Elevator Co., 733 N.E.2d 874, 125 (II1.App. Ct. 2000) (finding that
the liability of settled defendants should not be considered).
5. 905 N.E.2d at 727-29.
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cally address the status of settled parties for purposes of apportioning liability.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

HISTORY OF 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117

Joint and several liability is defined as "[l]iability that may be apportioned either among two or more parties or to only one or a few select
members of the group, at the adversary's discretion." 6 Therefore, a defendant that is jointly and severally liable is responsible for paying all of a
plaintiffs damages, even if that defendant is only partially responsible for
those damages.7 However, defendants that are found to be jointly and severally liable may be able to recover damages from other liable parties
through "a right of contribution and indemnity from nonpaying parties." 8
While joint and several liability is rooted in the common law, it was
codified in Illinois in 1986. 9 The codification was an attempt to move Illinois to a more equitable system of recovery, both for plaintiffs and for defendants.' 0 Prior to this codification, defendants in Illinois were jointly liable for the entirety of the plaintiffs damages, regardless of the defendant's
percentage of fault." This meant that any defendant, who was found to be
at fault for any portion of the plaintiffs injuries, could be forced to pay the
entirety of the damages awarded to the plaintiff. 12 With the codification,
however, came relief for defendants with less than one-fourth of the total
liability.' 3 The new statute stated that any defendant that is 25% or more
liable for a plaintiffs injuries is jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff s medical expenses, 14 while any defendant that is less than 25% liable is
only severally liable. 15 Therefore, a defendant with less than 25% liability
will only be responsible for paying the percentage of plaintiffs damages

6.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 997 (9th ed. 2009); see also Adukia v. Finney, 735
N.E.2d 174, 175 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000).
7.

8.

Adukia, 735 N.E.2d at 174.

Id.

9.
Tort Reform Act of 1986, Pub. Act 84-1431 Art. 5, § 1, 1986 Ill. Laws 3756
(amending the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1 (2008)).
10.
Eileen M. Walsh & Eugene G. Doherty, Section 2-1117: Several Liability's
Effect on Settlement and Contribution, 79 ILL. B.J. 122, 123 (1991) (explaining that Illinois

first codified joint and several liability in 1986).
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

Id.
Id.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (2008).
Id.

Id.
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that equal the percentage of the defendant's liability. 16 In order to determine
the degree of a defendant's liability, the statute listed the following parties
to which the defendant's liability can be compared: "the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party defendants who could
have been sued by the plaintiff."17 While this language may seem clear,
Illinois courts have had a difficult 8time deciding if settled defendants are
included in the above listed parties.'
The legislature attempted to clarify the language with the Tort Reform
Act of 1995.19 This amendment rephrased the language of the statute to
allow defendant's liability to be weighed against "all other tortfeasors ...
whose fault was a proximate cause" of the plaintiffs injury. 2° This broader
language made it clear that settled parties should be included when apportioning liability. 2' However, this amendment was held unconstitutional on
other grounds by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1997. 22 Even though the
court struck down the amendment on unrelated grounds, the text of the statute reverted to its original form, leaving the courts even more confused as
to the meaning of the statute's language. Since then, the statute has twice
been amended. 24 It now lists the following parties to consider when apportioning liability: "the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any

16.
Richard A. Michael, Joint Liability: Should It be Reformed or A bolished?-The
Illinois Experience, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 867 (1996).
17.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (2008).
18.
See, e.g., Ready v. United/Goedecke Servs., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725 (Ill. 2008)
(holding that the language does not include settled defendants); Unzicker v. Kraft Food
Ingredients Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1043 (Ill. 2002) (ruling that the language includes settled defendants); Heupel v. Jenkins, 884 N.E.2d 1263, 1270-71 (II1.App. Ct. 2008) (ruling
that the language includes settled defendants); Yoder v. Ferguson, 885 N.E.2d 1060, 1081
(I11.App. Ct. 2008) (holding that the language does not include settled defendants); Skaggs
v. Senior Servs. of Cent. Ill., Inc., 823 N.E.2d 1021, 1028-29 (I11.App. Ct. 2005) (holding
that the language does include settled defendants); Lombardo v. Reliance Elevator Co., 733
N.E.2d 874, 887 (I11.App. Ct. 2000) (ruling that settled defendants are not included in the
language); Blake v. Hy Ho Rest., Inc., 652 N.E.2d 807, 811 (111. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that
the language of the statute does not bar a court from dismissing a settled defendant).
19.
Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, Pub. Act 89-7, 1995 I11.Laws 284.
20. Id. at 299-300.
21.
Michael, supra note 16, at 869 (stating that the 1995 Act replaced joint and
several liability with several liability).
22.
Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1104 (I11.1997). The court
found the amendment unconstitutional because it created an arbitrary classification by which
the noneconomic recovery of some parties would be limited, while the noneconomic recovery of other parties would not. Id.
23.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 728-29 (debating the effect of the language of the
amendment upon the already confusing statute).
24.
Act of June 3, 2003, Pub. Act 93-10, 2003 111.Laws 69; Act of June 4, 2003,
Pub. Act 93-12, 2003 111.Laws 70.
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third party defendant except the plaintiffs employer." 25 However, this
amended language still leaves unanswered the question of whether or not
settled parties are to be included when apportioning liability. For years, the
appellate courts have been divided on this issue.26
B.

HISTORICAL DIVISION OF INTERPRETATION OF 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-

1117

Illinois courts have interpreted the language, "the defendants sued by
the plaintiff,, 27 in two opposing ways. One interpretation finds that the language includes settled defendants, while the other does not. 28 This dichotomy can best be illustrated by examining two opposing cases.
In Skaggs v. Senior Services of Central Illinois, Inc., the Fourth District held that a settled defendant's liability should be considered when apportioning liability. 29 The Plaintiff, Anna Skaggs, hired one of the defendants, Help at Home, Inc., to drive her to a polling place operated by another defendant, Senior Services. 30 The driver of the shuttle parked next to a
"depression in the parking lot." 3' After she had finished voting, the Plaintiff
returned to the shuttle, and while trying to reenter the shuttle, she fell and
broke both of her ankles.32 Before Plaintiff Skaggs brought suit against both
defendants, Help at Home filed for bankruptcy. Plaintiff and Help at Home
reached a settlement agreement and requested that the trial court find that
the settlement was made in good faith. The trial court complied with the
request, and thereafter, Senior Services objected.3 3 On appeal, the court
addressed the argument that, because the court found the settlement to be in
good 34faith, the court could not use Help at Home's liability to apportion
fault.

25.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (2008).
26.
See, e.g., Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1043 (I11.
2002); Yoder v. Ferguson, 885 N.E.2d 1060, 1081 (I11. App. Ct. 2008); Skaggs v. Senior
Servs. of Cent. Ill., Inc., 823 N.E.2d 1021, 1028 (I11.App. Ct. 2005); Heupel v. Jenkins, 884
N.E.2d 1263, 1270 (I11.App. Ct. 2002); Lombardo v. Reliance Elevator Co., 733 N.E.2d
874, 885 (I11.App. Ct. 2000); Blake v. Hy Ho Rest., Inc., 652 N.E.2d 807, 810 (111. App. Ct.
1995).
27.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (2008).
28.
Compare Skaggs, 823 N.E.2d at 1028-29 (holding that the liability of settled
defendants should be considered), with Lombardo, 733 N.E.2d at 885 (holding that the liability of settled defendants should not be considered).
29.
Skaggs, 823 N.E.2d at 1028-29.
Id. at 1023.
30.
31.

32.
33.
34.

Id.

Id.
Id. at 1024.
Skaggs, 823 N.E.2d at 1027.
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The court stated four reasons why it held that the liability of settled defendants should be considered.3 5 First, it stated that the "legislature intended
the division of responsibility to include those people in the suit who might
have been responsible for the plaintiff's injuries. 3 6 Second, the court stated
that by not allowing the liability of settled parties to be considered, plaintiffs could engage in "gamesmanship." 37 Third, the court stated that settled
parties should be included for reasons of judicial economy." Finally, the
court held that the plain meaning of the phrase, "defendants sued by the
plaintiff," included settled defendants, because those settled defendants had
40
39
been sued by the plaintiff. Other courts, however, have ruled differently.
In Lombardo v. Reliance Elevator Co., the First District ruled that the
41
liability of settled defendants should not be used in apportioning liability.
Plaintiff Lombardo was employed as a maintenance man for Avenue National Bank in Oak Park.42 The bank hired Reliance Elevator Company to
perform regular maintenance on the lift.43 Oak Park employed Edwin Jacobitz, and later Elevator Inspection Service (EIS), to inspect every elevator
and lift in the village twice a year. 4 Plaintiff Lombardo, suffered severe
injuries to his feet when a lift he was riding fell from street level to basement level.45 Lombardo brought suit against Reliance, EIS, Jacobitz, and
the beneficiary of the trust which owned the building in which the lift was
located, W.S. Partners (WS). Plaintiff reached settlements with Jacobitz and
EIS.46 The trial court allowed the jury to consider the settled defendants
when apportioning fault between the parties.47 The plaintiff appealed this
decision, and the First District Appellate Court reversed. 48
35.
36.

(Ill. 2002)).

Id. at 1027-28.
Id. (quoting Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1033

37.
Id. (giving a scenario where a plaintiff could settle with a poor defendant with
high liability in order to recover the majority of damages from a wealthy defendant with low
liability, thus circumventing the intent of section 2-1117).
38.
Id. at 1028-29 (explaining that to not allow the liability of settled defendants to
be considered in apportioning fault would cause courts to "conduct a full-blown pretrial
hearing to apportion liability" before it could determine if a settlement was in good faith).
Skaggs, 823 N.E.2d at 1029 (quoting language from 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/239.
1117 (2008)).
40.
See, e.g., Yoder v. Ferguson, 885 N.E.2d 1060, 1081 (II1.App. Ct. 2008); Lombardo v. Reliance Elevator Co., 733 N.E.2d 874, 885 (I11.App. Ct. 2000); Blake v. Hy Ho
Rest., Inc., 652 N.E.2d 807, 810-11 (111. App. Ct. 1995).
41.
Lombardo, 733 N.E.2d at 885.
42.
Id. at 887.
43.
Id.
44. Id.
45.
Id.
46. Lombardo, 733 N.E.2d at 887.
47. Id. at 879-80.
48. Id. at 884-85.
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The First District's main concern with the idea of allowing the liability
of settled defendants to be considered when apportioning fault was with
discovery costs to the settled defendants; 49 however, the court was also
worried about a possible negative effect on plaintiffs if the liability of settled defendants was not considered.5 ° The court conjectured that if the liability of the settled defendants was not considered, then juries would place
that liability upon the plaintiff, thereby limiting the damages a plaintiff
could recover. 5 1 The court did not express concern that extra liability might
end up on the shoulders of non-settled defendants. The court stated that,
"[e]ven though the court should include.., settling defendants on the verdict form, it should consider the fault of only those parties specified in section 2-1117 for purposes of determining joint liability. '' 52 This holding
shows that the First District interprets the language of section 2-1117 to
exclude settled defendants.53
For years, Illinois courts struggled with the interpretation of the language of section 2-1117.54 While the Illinois Supreme Court had previously
dealt with the meaning of the language,55 it was not until the court decided
Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc. 56 that Illinois courts had a clear
judicial articulation as to the meaning of the statutory text.

III.

FACTS OF READY V. UNITED/GOEDECKESERVICES, INC.

Michael Ready worked as a mechanic for Midwest Generation,
L.L.C. 57 In 1999, Midwest was in the midst of a pipe refitting project. 58 An
integral part of the project involved erecting scaffolding so that trusses
could be lifted several stories high. 59 The general contractor for the project
was BMW Constructors, Inc. 60 United/Goedecke Services, Inc. was the
subcontractor in charge of erecting the scaffolding.6 ' In December of 1999,
Ready assisted employees of both Midwest and United to raise trusses for
49.

50.

Id.at 884-85.

Id.

51.
Lombardo, 733 N.E.2d at 884-85 (citing Bofman v. Material Serv. Corp., 466
N.E.2d 1064 (I11.
App. Ct. 1984)).
52.
Id. at 885.
53.
Id.
54.
See cases cited supra note 18.
55.
See Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1033 (Il1.
2002).
56.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Servs., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725 (Ill.
2008).
57.
Id.at 727-28.
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
61.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 727-28.
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the scaffolding by standing below the scaffolding and giving directions via
hand signals.6 2 As Ready stood beneath the trusses, one of them slipped
loose.63 The truss fell over eight stories and struck and killed Ready. 4
Ready's wife filed a wrongful death suit against United, BMW, and
Midwest. 65 Before trial, Ready's wife settled with both BMW and Midwest.66 The trial court ruled that both the settlements were reached in good
faith, and United did not raise an objection to either settlement.67 As a result
of the trial court's ruling on numerous motions in limine, United was not
allowed to present evidence pertaining to the conduct of BMW and Midwest.68 Additionally, United's request to list BMW and Midwest on the
verdict form was also denied. 69 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, finding that while both United and Ready were negligent, United
was 65% liable, and Ready was 35% liable.70
United appealed the decision to the First District. On appeal, United
argued that, if BMW and Midwest had been included on the verdict form,
the jury could have found that United was less than 25% liable, and therefore would have only been severally liable as opposed to jointly liable. 7,
The appellate court agreed with United's argument, and remanded the case
liability. 72 Ready then appealed
for a new trial for purposes of determining
73
to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

REPORT

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's ruling by
holding that the liability of United should not have been assessed in relation
62.
Id.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
65.
Plaintiff initially only brought suit against United and BMW. Id. After United
and BMW filed third-party complaints against Midwest, the plaintiff amended her complaint
to add Midwest. Id.
66.
These settlements were in the amount of $1,113,000. Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 72728.
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
Id. at 728.
Id. The jury awarded damages of $14,230,000. After offsetting the award by
70.
plaintiff's liability and the amount of the settlements between BMW, Midwest, and the
plaintiff, the court held United was jointly liable for the amount of $8,137,000. Id.
71.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 728.
Id.
72.
73.
Id. The appellate court also held that "evidence relating to the culpability of...
settled defendants was relevant and admissible." Id. at 728.
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to BMW and Midwest. 74 In making its ruling, the supreme court's main

task was to determine whether or not the term "defendants sued by the
plaintiff' included defendants that had already settled with the plaintiff.75 In
order to answer this question, the court attempted to determine the intent of
the legislature in passing the statute.76 To do this, the court first asked if the
language of the statute had a "plain meaning. ' 77 It then asked, assuming
there was no plain meaning, would the issue be resolved by examining the
statute as a whole? 78 The court further looked to other tools of statutory
interpretation such as a legislature's failure to amend a statute, as well as
the effect of an amendment on a statute.79
1.

The Plain Meaning ofPlain Meaning

The court's first task in determining the meaning of the phrase "defendants sued by the plaintiff' 80 was to determine the legislative intent behind
enacting the statute. 8 ' In order to make this determination, the court first82
looked to the statute's language to determine if it had a plain meaning.
The court stated that the general rule, determining the plain meaning of the
text, was the surest way of determining the legislature's intent in passing
the statute.8 3
Both plaintiff and United argued that the statutory language was plain
and unambiguous.8 4 Of course, they both argued plain meanings of the sta74.
Id.at 734.
75.
Id. at 728. Another issue-etermining which version of the statute should
apply to the case-was decided by the appellate court. It found that the pre-amended version
of the statute was controlling. Ready v. United/Goedecke Servs., Inc., 854 N.E.2d 758, 761
(I11.
App. Ct. 2006), rev'd, 905 N.E.2d 725 (II1.2008).
76.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 728.
Id. at 729.
77.
78. Id.at 730.
79.
Id.at 731-34.
80. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (2008).
81.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 729.
Id.(referring to Hadley v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 864 N.E.2d 162,
82.
2006), for guidelines on interpreting the meaning of statutory text).
165 (I11.
83.
Id. The "plain meaning" test is not limited to statutory construction. It is also
used to determine the intent of parties to a contract or an insurance policy, and to determine
the intent of a testator. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. King, 651 N.E.2d 127, 129 (I11.
1995) (looking to the plain language of a will to determine the testator's intent); State Farm
App. Ct. 2008)
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Chi., 899 N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ill.
(using the plain meaning of the words in an insurance policy to determine the parties' intent); Lincoln Logan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fornshell, 722 N.E.2d 239, 242 (III. App. Ct. 1999)
(stating the rule that a contract is to be given the plain meaning of its language unless it is
ambiguous).
84.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 729-30.
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tute that were contradictory to one another.85 The court used the parties'
differing interpretations to show that the language of the statute was ambiguous, and therefore had no plain meaning.86 The court stated, "A statute is
ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonable wellinformed persons in two or more different senses. 87 While the plurality of
the court found the parties' two differing opinions to be enough to show
that the language was ambiguous, the dissent felt that the language was
clear.88
In her dissent, Justice Garman quoted the legal definition of the word
"sue, '89 and then analyzed the effect of verb tense upon the word's meaning. 90 Justice Garman contended9 that the plurality erred by looking to nonlegal dictionaries for definitions. ' She stated,
While it is not inappropriate to utilize a general usage dictionary to determine the meaning of a statutory term, even
if that term may also be found in a legal dictionary... the
plurality overlooks the requirement that a term will be
if the two asserted meanings
found to be ambiguous only
92
are themselves reasonable.
According to Justice Garman's dissent, because the word "sued" appears in
the statute in the passive voice, past tense, "it clearly refers to all the defendants against whom the plaintiff filed suit," 93 and therefore, the phrase "defendants sued by the plaintiff' only has one reasonable meaning95and is not
ambiguous. 94 The plurality did not find this argument persuasive.
85.
Id.
Id. at 730.
86.
Id. (quoting Wade v. N. Chi. Police Pension Bd., 877 N.E.2d 1101, 1116 (Ill.
87.
2007)).
dissenting).
Id. at 737-40 (Garman, J.,
88.
89.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 738 (Garman, J., dissenting) ("Black's Law Dictionary
defines the word 'sue' as '[t]o institute a lawsuit against (another party).' Given this meaning, all three of the defendants in the present case were sued by the plaintiff." (alterations in
original) (internal citation omitted) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1473 (8th ed. 2004)).
Id. at 738-39.
90.
Id. at 738.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. at 738-39.
93.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 739 (Garman, J., dissenting). In its opinion, the plurality
94.
dismisses this argument by stating the following:
We note that, in establishing this alleged "plain meaning," the dissent, in
addition to citing multiple dictionary definitions, engages in a rather
complex discussion of grammatical principles, particularly those relating
to participial verb forms. The need for such an extended discussion
strongly belies the notion that the statute unambiguously speaks in terms
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After determining that the language itself was ambiguous, the court
reviewed the statute as a whole to see if the statute either defined "defendants sued by the plaintiff," or at least suggested a clearer meaning. 96 The
court found that it did not.97 Finally, the court looked to the various ways
the appellate courts had interpreted the statutory language. 98 It stated,
"Though the difference in appellate court interpretations of section 2-1117
is not dispositive as to whether the statute is ambiguous, it strongly suggests
that it is." 99 Because the court found the phrase to be ambiguous, it was
forced to look to other methods of statutory interpretation.' 00
2.

The Effect of an Amendment upon Statutory Interpretation

After holding that the language of the statute was ambiguous, the court
next looked to see what effect, if any, the amendments included in the Tort
Reform Act of 1995 had upon the meaning of the statutory language. 10'
Plaintiff argued that the amendments included in the Tort Reform Act specifically included settled defendants in the group of parties whose liability
should be considered when apportioning fault, which meant that the statute
originally did not. 102 United argued that the amendments had no effect upon
that the ordinary person, exercising ordinary common sense, can understand.
Id.at 730-31 (plurality opinion).
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Id. The dissent rejected this contention as well. Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 737-38
(Garman, J. dissenting) ("The lack of a statutory definition could be seen as an indication of
the legislature's belief that the words it chose were so clear that they did not require further
definition or that a standard legal dictionary would reveal [the words to be] unambiguous.").
It is also worth noting that in his concurring opinion, Justice Kilbride stated that the language was clarified by looking at the statute as a whole. Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 735-36. (Kilbride, J., concurring). Justice Kilbride looks to the first sentence of the statute for guidance.
Id. He claims that "[o]nly those 'defendants found liable' 'in' the specified actions are implicated." Id.While Justice Kilbride claims to look to the text of the statute for clarification,
it is odd that he uses a rearrangement of the text of the statute to find the clarification for
which he is looking. The actual text of the statute reads, "[I]n actions . .. all defendants
found liable are jointly and severally liable." 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (2008).
98.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 731.
99. Id. at 730-31; see cases cited supra note 18 (discussing the various ways the
language has been interpreted by Illinois courts).
100.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 731.
101.
Pub. Act 89-7, 1995 Ill. Laws 284; see cases cited supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the unconstitutionality of the amendment).
102.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 732-33. An amendment to section 2-1116(b) provided a
new definition of "tortfeasor." Pub. Act 89-7, 1995 Ill. Laws 299. The definition reads,
"[A]ny person, excluding the injured person, whose fault is a proximate cause of the [injuries] for which recovery is sought ... regardless of whether that person may have settled
with the plaintiff." Id.
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the meaning of the statute since they were struck down as unconstitutional. 10 3 The court sided with the plaintiff, holding that "an amendment to a
statute creates a presumption that the amendment was intended to change
the law." 1°4
The dissent was not swayed by this argument.' 0 5 According to Justice
Garman, the plurality relied upon an incomplete canon of statutory construction. 1°6 She stated that an "amendment of an unambiguous statute indicates a purpose to change the law, while no such purpose is indicated by the
mere fact of an amendment of an ambiguous provision." 0 7 Therefore, under
the dissent's thinking, if the plurality was correct that the language was
ambiguous, there could be no automatic presumption that the amendment
was intended to change the law. 108
Finally, the plurality also took notice of the fact that the legislature did
not change the language in subsequent amendments to the statute.' 0 9 After
the amendments to the statute were struck down as being unconstitutional," 0 the Fifth District held that the liability of settled defendants should not
be considered when apportioning fault between parties."' The court held
that the legislature's failure to address the Blake holding was an indication
of legislature's acceptance of Blake's interpretation of section 2-11 17. " 112
B.

ANALYSIS

In attempting to answer the question of whether or not settled defendants are included in "defendants sued by the plaintiff,"' ' 13 the Ready plurality broke with precedent in three meaningful ways.114 First, the plurality

103.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 732; see cases cited supra note 22 and accompanying text
(explaining that the Illinois Supreme Court found the amendments unconstitutional).
104.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 732.
105.
Id. at 741 (Garman, J., dissenting).
106.
Id.
107.
Id. (quoting Williams v. Staples, 804 N.E.2d 489,499 (Ill. 2004)).
108.
Id. Unfortunately for the dissent, the opposite would also hold true. If the language was unambiguous, as the dissent contended, then there would be a presumption that
the amendment was intended to change the law. See id. at 741 (Garman, J., dissenting).
109.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 732 (plurality opinion).
110.
Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1104 (III. 1997); see cases cited
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
11I.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 732 (referring to Blake v. Hy Ho Rest., Inc., 652 N.E.2d
807, 810 (I11.App. Ct. 1995)).
112.
Id. at 733 (referring to Pub. Act 93-10, 2003 I11.Laws 69; Pub. Act 89-12, 2003
I1l. Laws 70).
113.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (2008).
114.
See supra Part 1V.A.2.
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ignored established conventions of statutory interpretation."l 5 Second, the
plurality broke with precedent in its interpretation of the effect of an
amendment on the meaning of a statute. 116 Third, the Ready plurality failed
to take into account the intentions of the legislature in passing the statute
when it ruled that settled1 defendants
should not be considered for purposes
7
of apportioning liability.'
1.

DeterminingAmbiguity

Determining intent through language is a tool used in many facets of
the law. 118 Beyond interpreting statutes, it is also used to clarify contracts,
insurance policies, and wills.' 19 The first step in using this tool is determining if the language has a plain meaning or if it is ambiguous. 2 0 The Ready
court answered this question by heavily focusing on one factor-whether or
not the parties disagreed as to the meaning of the statute. 121 This factor may
seem an appropriate test to determine ambiguity, but as recently as 2004,
the Illinois
Supreme Court stated that it was not necessarily determina122
tive.
In Johnstowne Centre Partnershipv. Chin, the Illinois Supreme Court
articulated an important consideration when determining ambiguity. 123 In
the case, the Chins, owners of a proposed restaurant, entered into a contract
with Johnstowne, a shopping center developer.124 According to a restrictive
covenant in the contract, the Chins' proposed eatery was to be the only restaurant in the shopping center. 125 The covenant did allow the shopping center to lease space to coffee shops or other snack shops if they did not offer
full meals. 126 Johnstowne entered into another contract with Lox, Stock, &
115.
See, e.g., Cent. 111.Light Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 821 N.E.2d 206, 214 (Ill. 2004)
(holding that a phrase is not made ambiguous just because parties disagree as to the phrase's
meaning); Johnstowne Ctr. P'ship v. Chin, 458 N.E.2d 480, 481 (Il. 1983) (holding that
while extrinsic evidence may be used to show a provision's meaning, that provision will not
be deemed ambiguous just because the parties disagree about its meaning).
116.
See Williams v. Staples, 804 N.E.2d 489, 499 (I1. 2004) (holding that an
amendment shows a presumption of a change in the law only when the law is unambiguous).
117.
See Edward Albin, Comment, The Inclusion of Settling Defendants Under Section 2-1117: The Right Move for Illinois Courts, 30 S. ILL. U. L.J. 315, 328-29 (2006).
118.
See supra note 83 (explaining different contexts in which the "plain meaning"
rule is used).
119.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
120.
Hadley v. Ill. Dep't. of Corrs., 864 N.E.2d 162, 165 (Il1.2007).
121.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Servs., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 730 (11. 2008).
122.
Cent. Ill. Light Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 821 N.E.2d 206, 214 (Il1.2004).
123.
458 N.E.2d 480, 481 (11. 1983).
124.
Id.at 480.
125.
Id.at 480-81.
126.
Id.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

Bagel (LSB) shortly after the Chins and Johnstowne entered into their contract. 27 LSB sold soups, sandwiches, salads, drinks, and desserts, but the
food was served cafeteria style. 128 The Chins never occupied the space they
leased from Johnstowne, and Johnstowne brought a breach of contract
claim. 29 The Chins claimed that by leasing space to LSB, Johnstowne had
violated the restrictive covenant t 30 Essentially, the Chins argued that LSB
was a restaurant,13 1 while Johnstowne claimed that LSB was closer to a
snack shop than a restaurant.132
The court acknowledged that both parties believed the terms of the restrictive covenant held different meanings, but it refused to find that the
covenant was ambiguous.!33 First, the court looked to the legal definition of
the word "restaurant."'' 34 Then, the court applied the legal definition to the
restrictive covenant and found that the covenant had been
breached because
35
restaurant.'
another
LSB,
to
space
leased
Johnstowne
Both the argument made by the Chins, and the argument made by
Johnstowne, were reasonable and well-informed, but the court did not find
the language of the covenant to be ambiguous because one of the parties
was wrong. 136 By using the legal definition of the word "restaurant," the
court was able to settle "the semantic battle" that occupied the lower court's
time and resources. 37 The Ready court could have benefited from using this
method
of determining ambiguity, as suggested in Justice Garman's dis38
sent.1
The Ready plurality justified its finding that the statutory text was ambiguous by stating, "A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different
senses."' 139 This legal maxim leaves the courts vulnerable to semantic dis127.
Id. at 481.
128.
Johnstowne Ctr. P"ship, 458 N.E.2d at 481.
129.
Id. at 480-81.
130.
Id.
131.
Id. at 481.
132.
Id.
133.
Johnstowne Ctr. P'ship, 458 N.E.2d at 481-82.
134.
Id. ("An establishment where refreshments or meals may be obtained by the
public. It includes cafes, lunchrooms, dairy lunch rooms, cafeterias, tea rooms, waffle houses, fountain lunches, sandwich shops, and many others." (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1477 (4th ed. 1968) (citations omitted)).
135.
Id.
136.
See id.
137.
Id. at 481-82.
138.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Servs., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 738 (111. 2008) (Garman, J., dissenting) (advocating the use of a legal dictionary to determine the plain meaning
of the word "sued").
139.
Id. at 730 (plurality opinion) (quoting Wade v. City of N. Chi. Police Pension
Bd., 877 N.E.2d 1101, 1116 (111. 2007)).
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putes unless it is tempered by the consideration articulated in the
Johnstowne case. 140 The Ready plurality emphasized the parties' different
understandings of the statutory text, and then searched through several different definitions, and multiple dictionaries-both legal and non-legal-to
find a definition that would justify Ready's understanding of the text.141
There is an argument that the consideration articulated in Johnstowne
is not applicable to Ready because Johnstowne dealt with the interpretation
of a contract, while Ready dealt with the interpretation of a statute. 142 This
argument is of little merit because the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that
contracts and statutes should be interpreted in the same way. 143 In Chudnovski v. Eckels, the Court stated,
It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation, and, when the words have a definite and precise
meaning, to go elsewhere in search of conjecture in order
to restrict or extend the meaning. Statutes and contracts
should be read and understood according to the natural and
most obvious import of the language, without resorting to
subtle and forced construction for the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation.'44
The Ready plurality erred when it used the parties' differing interpreta45
tions of the statutory language as proof that the language was ambiguous. 1
Instead, the court should have heeded the words of the
Johnstowne court,
46
and declined to descend unnecessarily into semantics. 1
2.

The Meaning of Amendments

The Ready plurality used the amendments contained in the Tort
Reform Act of 1995, and two other amendments to the Contribution Act, to
show that the phrase, "defendants sued by the plaintiff' did not include
settled defendants. 147 In doing so, the plurality relied upon two tenets of
140.
See Johnstowne Ctr. P'ship,458 N.E.2d at 481-82.
141.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 730.
142.
Compare Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 728-35 (dealing with the interpretation of a
statute), with Johnstowne Ctr. P'ship,458 N.E.2d at 481 (dealing with the interpretation of a
contract).
143.
Chudnovski v. Eckels, 83 N.E. 846, 847 (II1.1908).
144.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting City of Beardstown v. City of Virginia, 76 I11. 34,
40 (1875)).
145.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 738 (Garman, J., dissenting).
146.
See Johnstowne Ctr. P'ship,458 N.E.2d at 481-82 (stating that a term is not
ambiguous solely because two parties disagree on the term's meaning).
147.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 732-33.
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statutory interpretation. 48 The first of these tenets is that failure of the legislature to amend a law after a court has interpreted it is proof of the legislature's agreement with the court's interpretation. 149 The second tenet is that
amends a law, it is presumed that the intent is to
when the legislature
150
change the law.
First, the plurality stated that, "where the legislature chooses not to
amend a statute after a judicial construction, it is presumed that the legisla' 151
ture has acquiesced in the court's statement of the legislative intent.
Notably, the plurality relied upon Wakulich v. Mraz for this point, 152 yet an
argument can be made that these cases are distinct due to the degree to
which the tenet is applied.
In Wakulich, the mother of a deceased teenage girl brought a wrongful
death suit against a man for providing alcohol to the underage girl. 153 The
mother sought recovery from the man under both under the Illinois Dramshop Act'5 4 and a common-law theory. 55 The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the mother's claims for two reasons.1 56 First, the court held that the
Dramshop Act "preempted the entire field of alcohol-related liability.' 5 7
Second, the court held that, because the legislature had chosen to not include social hosts in the Dramshop Act, the Dramshop Act excluded social
hosts. 158 The court mentioned that, on six different occasions, the legislature
had considered including social hosts in the act, but had rejected the idea
each time. 159 It was from this point that the court referenced the tenet that
where the legislature chooses not to amend a statute after a judicial conlegislature has acquiesced in the court's
struction, it is presumed that the 60
intent.'
legislative
the
of
statement
The legislative intent referenced by the court in Wakulich was that the
6
entirety of the Act was to preempt all alcohol related liability in Illinois.' '
The legislative intent pronounced in Ready was that the phrase "defendants

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
785 N.E.2d
161.

Id.
Id. at 731-32 (citing Wakulich v. Mraz, 785 N.E.2d 843, 849 (111. 2003)).
Id. at 732-33.
Id. at 732 (citing Wakulich, 785 N.E.2d at 849).
785 N.E.2d at 849-50.
Id. at 845.
235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-21 (2000).
Wakulich, 785 N.E.2d at 847.
Id. at 848-50.
Id. at 848.
Id.
Id.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Servs., Inc. 905 N.E.2d 725, 731 (citing Wakulich,
at 849).
Wakulich, 785 N.E.2d at 850.
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sued by the plaintiff' did not include settled defendants. 162 The intent in
Wakulich involved the intent of the entire Dramshop Act.1 63 The intent in
Ready involved the meaning of one phrase, in one section, of the Contribution Act. 64
The Ready dissent also raises the issue of the likelihood of the legislature knowing appellate level decisions as compared to the likelihood of it
being aware of Illinois Supreme Court decisions. 16 According to the dissent, "the canon [ofjudicial acquiescence] is much stronger when applied to
previous decisions
of this court than when applied to an appellate court
16 6
decision.,

After discussing the effect of the legislature not amending a law, the
Ready plurality discussed how an amendment to a law could clarify the
meaning of the law. 167 The plurality stated, "[A]n amendment to a statute
creates a presumption that the amendment was intended to change the
law."'' 68 In order to support its reliance upon this tenet, the plurality cited
People v. Hicks. 169 Once again, however, an argument can be made that
Hicks and Ready are distinct due to the degree by which they apply the tenet upon which they both rely.
In Hicks, the defendant, who was convicted of burglary and theft, appealed the lower court's allowance of evidence of defendant's prior theft
conviction. 170 The lower court allowed the evidence, based upon its interpretation of the Illinois Theft Statute."' The suprem court upheld the lower court's holding in part because of an amendment to the law passed between the time of the defendant's commission of the crime, and the court's
hearing of the appeal. 72 The amendment clarified the language by stating
that evidence of the prior conviction could not be shown during a jury trial.' 73 The court used this amendment to find that, prior to the amendment,
the statute allowed for evidence of a prior conviction to be shown to a jury
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

171.

Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 729-30.
Wakulich, 785 N.E.2d at 850.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 729-30.
Id. at 743 (Garman, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 732 (plurality opinion).
Id.(citing People v. Hicks, 518 N.E.2d 148, 151 (II1. 1987)).
Hicks, 518 N.E.2d at 151.
Id. at 149.

720

ILL. COMP. STAT.

5/16-1 (2008). The statute allows for a misdemeanor

offense to be charged as a felony if the guilty party has previously been convicted of one of a
number of other crimes. Id. At the time of the Hicks decision, the statutory language was
unclear as to whether evidence of the defendant's previous conviction should be introduced
at trial or at sentencing. Hicks, 518 N.E.2d at 151.
172.
Hicks, 518 N.E.2d at 151.
173.
Id.at 150.
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trial. 174 Compare this amendment to the language questioned in the Ready
case.
In Ready, the question was whether or not the phrase "defendants sued
by the plaintiff' included settled defendants.1 75 Whether or not settled defendants were included in the phrase, could potentially determine whether
other defendants were severally liable or jointly and severally liable. 176 The
Ready court placed significance on the 1995 amendment of the Contribution Act.177 This amendment changed the statutory definition of "tortfeasor"
to
any person, excluding the injured person, whose fault is a
proximate cause of the [injury] for which recovery is
sought, regardless of whether that person is the plaintiffs
employer, regardless of whether that person is joined as a
party to the action, and regardless of whether that person
may have settled with the plaint f. 78
What the plurality failed to address, however, is that the 1995 amendment
179
did away with joint liability all together, leaving only several liability.
Under a recovery scheme based solely on several liability, it would not
matter whether or not settled defendants were included in the phrase "defendants sued by the plaintiff," because defendants with low liability would
not have to worry about paying for the liability of other defendants. The
1995 amendment, therefore, changed the structure of the Contribution Act
so dramatically that it would seem inappropriate to take a small portion and
apply it out of context.
Additionally, the Ready dissent also took issue with the plurality's use
of the latter tenet of statutory interpretation as being incomplete. 180 According to the dissent, the full and more appropriate tenet of statutory interpretation is that an "amendment of an unambiguous statute indicates a purpose to
change the law, while no such purpose is indicated by the mere fact of an
,,181
amendment of an ambiguous provision.

174.
Id.at 151.
175.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Servs., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 728 (111.
2008).
176.
See supra Part II.A.
177.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 732.
178.
Id.at 732 (quoting the revised language of section 2-1116(b) in Pub. Act 89-7
1995 111.Laws 284).
179.
Pub. Act 89-7 1995 111.Laws 284.
180.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 741 (Garman, J., dissenting).
181.
Id. (citing Williams v. Staples, 804 N.E.2d 489, 498 (II1.2004)).
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The Intent of the Legislature

The Ready plurality stated, "In construing the meaning of the statute,
our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature."1' 82 The court then stated that the intent of the legislature was not
clear from looking at the statute as a whole.' 83 Next, the court looked to the
effect of an amendment on the meaning of a statute's language. 84 The court
then examined the non-binding statements of a Senator discussing a possible amendment to section 2-1117.185 These methods, while appropriate, are
not the only means of determining the intent of a legislature. 186 The Illinois
Supreme Court previously stated that "[l]egislative intent can be ascertained
from a consideration of the entire Act, its nature, its object and the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other."' 87 It
would have been appropriate for the Ready plurality to consider the legislature's intent in passing the Contribution Act as a whole, as opposed to just
focusing on section 2-1117.188
The Contribution Act was initially passed by the legislature in an effort to more evenly distribute the cost of a plaintiffs harms.' 89 The legislature felt it was unfair for the burden of paying all of plaintiffs damages to
fall on one of several liable defendants. 90 It therefore determined that defendants should only be ultimately liable for the portion of plaintiffs harm
that they caused.' 9 1
Before section 2-1 117 was passed, defendants were still jointly and
severally liable. 192 Therefore, if one defendant were found to be 1% liable,
she could be responsible for paying 100% of the plaintiff's damages, while
retaining the right of contribution from the other defendants. 193 Section 21117 further eased the burden of defendants with low liability by making
182.

Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 729 (quoting DeLuna v. Burciaga, 857 N.E.2d 229, 236

(Il. 2006)).
183.
Id. at 730.
184.
Id. at 732-33.
185.
Id. at 733. While discussing an amendment that would make clear "what the

intent of the 1986 law was," Senator Cullerton stated that the intent of the legislature was not
to include settled defendants when apportioning liability. 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, Mar. 20, 2007, at 77 (statement of Sen. Cullerton). It is telling that this proposed

amendment did not pass in the House.
186.
187.

See, e.g., In re Donald A.G., 850 N.E.2d 172, 178-79 (Ill. 2006).
Id. (quoting Fumarolo v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1302 (Il. 1990)).

189.

Walsh & Doherty, supra note 10, at 122-23.

188.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 124.
Id.
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them only severally liable, and not jointly and severally liable.194 Put another way, one of the goals of the legislature in passing the original Contribution Act was to promote a "policy favoring the equitable apportionment of
damages among tortfeasors."'' 95 Section 2-1117196furthers this policy by easing the burden on minimally liable defendants.
If the purpose of the Contribution Act was to ease the burden placed
on minimally liable defendants, it then follows that the legislative intent
behind passing the Contribution Act was to ease the burden of minimally
liable defendants.1 97 It must then be determined if the exclusion of settled
defendants from the phrase "defendants sued by the plaintiff' would ease
the burden of minimally liable defendants. 98 Excluding settled defendants
from the phrase "defendants sued by the plaintiff," does not further the policy the statute was enacted to promote. 199 Therefore, the legislature intended
settled defendants
to be included in the phrase, "defendants sued by the
200
plaintiff.
V.

PRACTICAL IMPACT AND POLICY CONCERNS

If drawn to its natural conclusions, the Ready decision impacts Illinois
law in two distinct ways. 20 1 The first way Illinois law is impacted is by excluding settled defendants from the phrase, "defendants sued by the plaintiff," in section 2-1117.202 The second way in which the decision will make
an impact upon Illinois law is less obvious, but will potentially have a
broader effect-the way in which Illinois courts will interpret statutes in the
future.
A.

EXCLUSION OF SETTLED DEFENDANTS

With the decision in Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., the Illinois Supreme Court held that settled defendants are not included in the
phrase "defendants sued by the plaintiff., 20 3 The obvious effect of this ruling is that settled parties will no longer be considered by juries when apportioning fault.20 4 Refusing to consider the liability of settled defendants has
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Walsh & Doherty, supra note 10, at 124.
Bowers v. Murphy & Miller, Inc., 650 N.E.2d 608, 610 (II1.App. Ct. 1995).
See Albin, supra note 117, at 328-29.
See In re Donald A.G., 850 N.E.2d 172, 178-79 (111. 2006).
Id.
Albin, supra note 117, at 328-29.
Id.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Servs., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 734 (II1.
2008).
Id. at 735.
Id. at 734.
Id.
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the potential to adversely affect minimally liable defendants, because "[t]he
clear legislative intent behind section 2-1117 is that minimally responsible
defendants should not have to pay entire damage awards., 20 5 By not allowing fault to be apportioned between all of the responsible parties-even
settled parties-minimally liable defendants could be found to be more
liable than they should be. Not only could this lead to potentially unfair
findings of liability, it could bias plaintiffs from settling with certain defendants.2 °6
Imagine a plaintiff that has been injured in an accident caused solely
by the actions of two defendants. Next, imagine that the first defendant is
70% liable but has shallow pockets. Finally, imagine that the second defendant is 30% liable but has very deep pockets. If the plaintiff were to settle
with the minimally liable defendant for a sum fair to both parties, the plaintiff would be left with the difficult task of trying to recover the plurality of
the damages it is due from a defendant with no money. It is not hard to imagine a world where a plaintiff might refuse to settle with the minimally
liable defendant in order to easily receive its payment for damages. 20 7 While
the Ready ruling has its unfortunate consequences for non-settled defendants, there is still another, more subtle, effect-the potential to keep plaintiffs from being made whole.20 8
The Ready dissent illustrates the manner in which the plurality's holding could keep plaintiffs from being made whole.20 9 Under the Ready holding, the liability of plaintiffs will still be assessed against the liability of all
other non-settled defendants.21 0 Not only does this have the potential to
unfairly affect minimally liable defendants, but it also has the potential to
unfairly affect plaintiffs as well. 2 1' Without comparing the liability of all
parties-including those that have settled-a jury could potentially find a
plaintiff to be more liable than it would have otherwise.212
Imagine a plaintiff was in an accident with damages equaling
$100,000. The plaintiff was 30% liable for the accident. Next, imagine one
defendant is 40% liable, while a second defendant is 30% liable. Finally,
2002).
Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1033 (I11.
205.
dissenting).
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 746 (Garman, J.,
206.
207.
See id. The Ready dissent stated that "[a]lthough such a result would fully compensate the injured plaintiff, it would do so by imposing excessive liability on a minimally
responsible defendant. Such a result is not consistent with the public policy of this state as
expressed by the legislature." 1d; see also Walsh & Doherty supra note 10 (explaining that
the legislature codified section 2-1117 in an attempt to move Illinois to a more equitable
system of recovery for both plaintiffs and defendants).
208.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 746 (Garman, J., dissenting).
Id.
209.
210.
Id.
211.
Id.
212.
Id.
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imagine that the plaintiff settles with the defendant that is 40% liable. If the
jury was left to assess the liability of the plaintiff against the remaining
defendant, they would find each party to be 50% liable. 213 The recovery for
damages based upon the 50% liability of the defendant would be reduced
further by the amount of the settlement of the first defendant. Therefore,
instead of recovering $30,000 in damages, as well as a $40,000 settlement,
21 4
the plaintiff will recover $10,000 in damages and the $40,000 settlement.
Under the scenario created by the Ready decision, the plaintiff would be
awarded $20,000 less than he would have been awarded had the apportionment of liability been factored in the liability of the settled defendant.2 15
According to the dissent, this result would be inconsistent with the intent of
the legislature.216
B.

THE FUTURE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Two different Illinois Appellate Districts have already cited Ready as
precedent for the proper method of interpreting a statute. 217 In one of these
two cases, People ex rel. Board of Trustees of Chicago State University v.
Siemens Building Technology, Inc. (CSU), the effects of Ready's interpretation methodology can already been seen. 22118 Citing Ready, CSU stated, "In
determining the plain meaning of a statute's terms, we consider the statute
in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses, and the apparent
intent of the legislature in enacting the statute., 219 By relying on the
precedent set in Ready, the CSU court relies on an altered tenet of statutory
construction. 2
The Illinois Supreme Court has stated about itself that "[t]he primary
objective of this court when construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature., 22' The first step in interpreting a statute is to look at the plain meaning of the words used by the
213.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 746 (Garman, J. dissenting).
214.
Id.
215.
Id.
216.
Id.
217.
See JB4 Air LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, 905 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Il1. App. Ct. 2009)
(using the Ready methodology to determine that the word "individual" as used in a statute
meant human beings and not business entities); People ex rel. Bd. of Trs. of Chi. State Univ.
v. Siemens Bldg. Tech., Inc., 900 N.E.2d 414, 420 (I11.App. Ct. 2008) (citing Ready to
determine if a statutory provision required reimbursements to be paid annually, or at the end
of a contract).
218.
Bd. of Trs. of Chi. State Univ., 900 N.E.2d at 420.
219.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Ready v. United/Goedecke Servs., Inc., 2008 Il1.
Lexis 1439, *7, reh'g denied, 905 N.E.2d 725 (I11.2009)).
220.
Id.
221.
DeLuna v. Burclaga, 857 N.E.2d 229, 236 (I11.2006).
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legislature.22 2 The tenet does not call for the court to consider the intent of
the legislature while determining the plain meaning. 223 Only if the language
is found to be ambiguous, after looking at the plain meaning of the words
used, should a court further look to determine the intent of the legislature in
passing a law.224 To do otherwise would allow the court to rely upon its
own preconceived notions of the statute's meaning to color its interpretation
of the statute.
The Ready dissent also raised another concern about the precedent the
case would set for statutory interpretation. 22 5 When discussing the implications of the plurality's methods of statutory construction, the dissent stated,
[T]he application of this canon of construction reveals the
importance of making a careful determination of the threshold question of ambiguity. If the statutory language is
truly ambiguous, then the acquiescence canon has a certain
logic, especially if the judicial interpretation that is deemed
to have been acquiesced to is a decision of the highest court
in the jurisdiction. If, however, the statutory language is not
ambiguous, the application of this and other canons of construction may obscure, rather than reveal, the intent of the
enacting legislature. In my opinion, we are most vulnerable
the bench"
to a legitimate accusation of "legislating from
226
when we find ambiguity where there is none.
The dissent suggested that, by not following the tenets of statutory interpretation, the Illinois courts come uncomfortably close to crossing the line
between the legislative and the judicial branches. 27
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Ready plurality erred by holding that the phrase, "defendants sued
by the plaintiff," as found in section 2-1117, does not include settled defendants. Excluding the liability of settled defendants from the process of apportioning liability is against the intent of the legislature. 228 The exclusion
of settled defendants can also cause non-settled parties-plaintiffs and defendants alike-to suffer injustice through the amount of damages
222.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Servs., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 729 (Ill. 2008) (citing
Hadley v. 111.Dep't of Corrs., 864 N.E.2d 162, 165 (Il. 2007)).
223.
Id.
224.
DeLuna, 857 N.E.2d at 236.
Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 746 (Garman, J., dissenting).
225.
226.
Id. at 745 (citation omitted).
227.
Id.
228.
Id. at 747.
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awarded. 229 Because of the precedent now set by the Ready court, minimally liable defendants can be held responsible for paying an entire damage
award. 230 Additionally, the Ready court created an incentive for plaintiffs to
avoid settling with minimally liable defendants that have deep pockets.2 3'
The Ready decision was also incorrect because it has the potential to
keep plaintiffs from being made whole. 32 The Ready plurality has created a
scenario by which a plaintiff could be held more liable than if their liability
was weighed against that of settled defendants.233 The chance of being
found more liable-and therefore receiving a lower damage award-could
be enough to keep the plaintiff from settling with defendants. One of the
main purposes of the Contribution Act is to encourage parties to settle.234
Because the decision discourages settlement between two parties, it goes
against the legislature's intent in passing the law, and the decision is, therefore, incorrect.
Beyond discouraging settlement and creating the possibility of injustice, the Ready decision was decided incorrectly by misusing long-standing
tenets of statutory interpretation. 235 The Ready plurality first found unambiguous language to be ambiguous.23 6 It then misused the tenet of judicial
acquiescence-the tenet of determining a law's meaning through its
amendments. 237 The effects of this misuse of the tenets of statutory interpretation can already be seen in the rulings of the Illinois Appellate Courts.23 8
Finally, the holding of Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc.-and the
methodology used to reach that holding-come dangerously close to legislating from the bench.2 39 The Illinois Legislature should therefore amend
the language of section 2-1 117 to explicitly state that settled defendants are
to be considered when apportioning fault between parties to a suit.
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